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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GREGORY N. OLIVER,
Supreme Court
Case No.

Petitioner,
v.

Court of Appeals
Case No. 890625-CA

STATE OF UTAH,

Priority No. 13

Respondent.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1. Does a
a duty to prepare
evidence which is
corroborative of,

criminal defense attorney have
the defense and investigate
"cumulative" to, or
the defendant's testimony?

2. How is a criminal defense attorney on
direct appeal to present evidence, which was not
originally presented in the trial court, to
establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel?

OPINION AND ORDER OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The court of appeals' opinion and order denying rehearing
are in Appendix 1 to this petition.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
The court of appeals filed State v. Oliver. 170 Utah Adv.
Rep. 44 (Utah App. 1991), on September 26, 1991.

Counsel for

Mr. Oliver filed a Petition for Rehearing on October 9, 1991. The
court of appeals denied Mr. Oliver's Petition for Rehearing on
October 17, 1991.

This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is timely

under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 48(a).

Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) (Supp. 1991)
provide this Court's jurisdiction over this Petition for Writ of
Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals.

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The full text of the following provisions is contained in
Appendix 2 to this petition.
Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 7;
Constitution of Utah, Article I Section 12;
United States Constitution, Amendment VI;
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV,
section 1.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

PROCEEDINGS BELOW
A jury convicted Mr. Oliver of burglary, a second degree

felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 76-2-202, and theft,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section
76-6-404, in the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable
Michael R. Murphy, Judge, presiding.

Judge Murphy sentenced

Mr. Oliver to prison for concurrent terms of zero to five and one to
fifteen years, and ordered Mr. Oliver to pay restitution
(R. 166-167).
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed Mr. Oliver's burglary
conviction and reversed Mr. Oliver's theft conviction, remanding the
case to the trial court to reduce Mr. Oliver's third degree felony
theft conviction to a class A misdemeanor theft conviction.

- 2
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State v. Oliver, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. at 44.
The court of appeals denied Mr. Oliver's Petition for
Rehearing.

B.

FACTS
The court of appeals' "background" discussion is an

adequate description of the facts underlying Mr. Oliver's
convictions.
App. 1991).

State v. Oliver, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 44-45 (Utah
For purposes of this petition, this Court should be

aware of two additional events.

1.

Trial Counsel's Admission
On the morning that trial was scheduled to begin, in

support of Mr. Oliver's motion for a continuance, which motion the
trial court denied, trial counsel stated in open court,
I didn't do any formal trial preparation that I
normally do for a trial such as this, and
consequently, I am not prepared to proceed to
trial.
(T. 4). This admission supplements the court of appeals' discussion
of how trial counsel expected to resolve this case through a guilty
plea until the morning that trial began, which discussion appears at
page 5 of the Oliver opinion.

2. Appellate Counsel's Attempts on Direct Appeal to Demonstrate
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
On direct appeal, after private trial counsel had withdrawn
from representing Mr. Oliver, appellate counsel, who was appointed

- 3
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to represent Mr. Oliver, moved the court of appeals for an
evidentiary hearing in the trial court.

This motion was designed to

establish record proof of, and dispose of, Mr. Oliver's contentions
that the trial court's forcing trial counsel to proceed to trial
without adequate preparation violated Mr. Oliver's rights to
effective assistance of counsel and to due process of law.
of this motion is in Appendix 3 to this petition.

A copy

The court of

appeals denied the motion for an evidentiary hearing in the trial
court.

Mr. Oliver renewed his motion for an evidentiary hearing in

his reply brief.
The court of appeals assessed Mr. Oliver's due process and
ineffective assistance claims on the merits by considering the
evidence that was discussed in Mr. Oliver's motion for an
evidentiary hearing,1 despite the fact that much of that evidence
has never been developed properly or supplemented to the record in
any traditional manner.

In considering this evidence, the court of

appeals did not mention Mr. Oliver's motion for an evidentiary
hearing, and gave no indication as to how defense counsel on direct

1. The court of appeals summarized three areas of evidence
that Mr. Oliver would have addressed in the requested evidentiary
hearing:
[evidence that would] (1) support Oliver's
testimony regarding his prior conviction based on
misidentification; (2) expose weaknesses in the
eyewitness identification testimony; and
(3) support Mr. Oliver's assertions concerning
possible police misconduct involved in the photo
show up.
Id. at 45 and 46. Mr. Oliver relied on these same three areas of
evidence to establish the denial of his rights to due process of law
and to effective assistance of counsel. See Appendix 2 to this
petition.
- 4
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appeal is to present evidence of trial counsel's ineffectiveness
and/or the due process violation.

REASONS WHY QUESTIONS PRESENTED JUSTIFY ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT
A.

QUESTION 1
The first question presented for this Court's review is,
Does a criminal defense attorney have a duty to
prepare the defense and investigate evidence
which is "cumulative11 to, or corroborative of,
the defendant's testimony?
This Court should grant a writ of certiorari on this

question because the Oliver opinion answers this question in the
negative, and thus conflicts with polestar opinions of this Court,
the United States Supreme Court, and of a different panel of the
Utah Court of Appeals.

See State v. Tempiin, 805 P.2d 182, 188

(Utah 1990); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984);
State v. Crestani. 771 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah App. 1989).
The Oliver opinion correctly notes the two-pronged showing
a criminal defendant must make to establish a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel:

"(1) that his or her counsel's performance

was deficient; and (2) that counsel's performance prejudiced the
defendant."

Oliver at 46, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984).
The court of appeals held that Mr. Oliver did not establish
the deficient performance prong of the Strickland test.

The court

of appeals' rationale was that Mr. Oliver had failed to show
deficient performance because the evidence identified by Mr. Oliver

- 5
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on appeal as evidence omitted by trial counsel was "cumulative" to
Mr. Oliver's testimony, to trial counsel's cross-examination of the
State's witnesses, and to argument presented by trial counsel.

The

court of appeals' resolution of the ineffective assistance claim is
as follows:
Although Oliver points to three specific
areas in which he claims his counsel should have
been more prepared, the record, as discussed
regarding Oliver's due process claims,2
establishes that his attorney presented evidence
and argument to the jury in all of these areas.
Any additional evidence would have been
cumulative. Oliver has failed to demonstrate how
his counsel's performance was deficient and
therefore we need not address whether Oliver was
prejudiced by such performance.
Id. at 47.
The Oliver analysis conflicts with Strickland, which
provides that "counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations
or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary."

466 U.S. 668, at 691.

While it may be

that a defense attorney's failure to investigate may be harmless

2. The court's analysis of the due process issue, which
overlaps the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis, is as
follows:
Defense counsel questioned Oliver about his
previous conviction based on eyewitness
misidentification, and again brought the prior
misidentification to the jury's attention during
closing argument. He cross-examined each
eyewitness who testified and addressed the
weaknesses of each person's testimony at length
in his closing argument. Defense counsel also
cross-examined Deputy Matthews about his
investigation and the photo show up he conducted
with at least one of the eyewitnesses.
Id. at 46.

- 6
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under the second prong of Strickland, a defense attorney's failure
to investigate adequately is always deficient performance.

State v.

Tempiin. 805 P.2d 182, 188 (Utah 1990).

The Oliver court's reasoning that a defense attorney has no
duty to present evidence that is "cumulative" to the defendant's
testimony conflicts with this Court's decision in State v. Tempiin.
805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990).

In Tempiin. this Court recognized that

under the first prong of Strickland, defense attorneys must
"adequately investigate ... the availability of prospective defense
witnesses."

Id. at 188.

Part of the reason that this Court

reversed Mr. Tempiin's conviction was that the trial attorney had
failed to investigate and present witnesses to bolster Mr. Tempiin's
testimony.

Id. at 188-189.

The Oliver court's reliance on trial counsel's performance
at trial, in spite of trial counsel's admission that he was not
prepared to proceed to trial, conflicts with State v. Crestani. 771
P.2d 1085 (Utah App. 1989), which was written by a different panel
of the court of appeals.

In Crestani. the panel rejected the trial

court's assertion that a defense attorney's inadequate preparation
is mollified if the attorney's trial performance is superficially
adequate.

The panel stated,

In its memorandum decision, the trial
court stated, that "[t]here is no question that
preparation for a trial is important but the
final test is counsel's conduct in the
courtroom." We think the court's emphasis is
misplaced. Certainly, there can be no
appropriate performance in the courtroom without
adequate preparation, and without such
preparation, representation is nothing but a sham
and a pretense.
- 7
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Id. at 1092.
Aside from the fact that the Oliver opinion is inconsistent
with well-established authority, the Oliver opinion undercuts the
importance of trial preparation by criminal defense attorneys, and
thereby impacts adversely on some of the most fundamental rights in
our criminal justice system.3

The criminal defendants' rights to

prepared defense counsel are perhaps the most important rights,
because criminal defendants must rely on counsel to assert all other
rights, and to present all defenses.4
Because of the importance of the rights obfuscated by the
Oliver decision, this Court should grant the writ on Question 1, and
reiterate to the court of appeals, the lower courts, and criminal
defense attorneys the precept that a criminal defense attorney has a
duty to prepare the defense and investigate evidence to corroborate
the defendant's testimony.

3. Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, included
in Appendix 1 to this petition, contains many specific rights that
together recognize the importance of prepared trial counsel in
criminal cases. Article I Section 7 of the Utah Constitution also
protects the right to present a complete defense. State v. Harding,
635 P.2d 33 (Utah 1981).
The right to effective assistance of counsel is protected
by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The right to a
prepared defense is protected not only by the Sixth Amendment, but
also by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,
690 (1986).
4.

See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653-654

(1984).
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B.

QUESTION 2
The second question for this Court's review is,
How is a criminal defense attorney on direct
appeal to present evidence, which was not
originally presented in the trial court, to
establish ineffective assistance of trial counsel?
This Court should grant a writ of certiorari on Question 2

because this Court is constitutionally empowered to create rules of
procedure and evidence,5 and should exercise these powers in this
case to inform appellate attorneys and the court of appeals how to
proceed in similar cases.
In State v. Humphries, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Utah 1991),
this Court recognized that
generally a claim of ineffectiveness of trial
counsel cannot be raised on appeal because the
trial record is insufficient to allow the claim
to be determined. ... [H]owever, ... ineffective
assistance of trial counsel should be raised on
appeal if the trial record is adequate to permit
decision of the issue and defendant is
represented by counsel other than trial counsel.
Id. at 7.
Unfortunately, however, it is not always clear whether the
trial record is adequate to dispose of the claim.6

This creates a

dilemma for the criminal defendant and appellate counsel.

On one

5. Article VIII Section 4 of the Utah Constitution
provides this Court's rulemaking powers.
6. In the instant case, for instance, given the trial
court's forcing trial counsel to trial despite trial counsel's
admission that he had done no formal preparation and was not
prepared to go to trial, and given the omissions of trial counsel
that appear in the record created in the trial court, it is arguable
that the record is adequate to establish the claim of ineffective
(footnote continues)
- 9
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hand, the defendant and appellate counsel are encouraged to raise
the ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal if the record may
be considered adequate, in order to preserve the issue,7 and because
there is no guarantee that the defendant will be appointed counsel
in subsequent proceedings.

On the other hand, the defendant and

appellate counsel may be wary of adjudicating the part of the claim

(footnote 6 continued)
assistance. See Appendix 2 to this petition, discussing record
evidence that substantiates the claim; Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 691-696 (1984)(discussing varying degrees of prejudice
that are presumed, or must be shown, when varying kinds of
ineffective assistance of counsel are involved); State v. Tempiin,
805 P.2d 182, 186 n.20 (Utah 1990)(same). Other cases demonstrate
that it is not always clear whether the record is adequate to
dispose of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See e.g.
State v. Humphries, 171 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 6-7 (Utah 1991)(while this
Court found the record adequate to reverse Mr. Humphries'
conviction, it was the opinion of the State that the record was not
adequate, and that the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel
should be addressed in a postconviction proceeding with an
evidentiary hearing).
7. In Jensen v. DeLand, 795 P.2d 619 (Utah 1989), this
Court allowed a plaintiff in postconviction relief proceedings an
evidentiary hearing on his allegation of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel. Id. at 621. The plaintiff's attorney on the direct
appeal of the criminal conviction advised him that the record on
appeal was insufficient to support the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, and that the defendant should wait to develop
the record in postconviction proceedings. Id. at 620-621. This
Court did not indicate whether the attorney on direct appeal was
correct in refusing to raise the issue on direct appeal. This Court
remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing,
because the record was inadequate to address the claims of
ineffectiveness. Id. at 621. This Court warned, however, that
appellate attorneys should raise the issue on direct appeal when
possible, stating,
By our decision today, we do not suggest or imply
that a criminal defendant may strategically
abstain from raising an ineffective-assistanceof-counsel claim which could be reviewed on
direct appeal. We do not and will not sanction
manipulation of that sort.
Id. at 621.
- 10 -

that is reflected in the traditional appellate record, wishing to
present all aspects of the claim in one forum with a better
cumulative chance at showing prejudice from all of trial counsel's
deficiencies.8
In this case, appellate counsel for Mr. Oliver attempted to
present all traditional record evidence that appears to demonstrate
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

Counsel also attempted to

identify and develop all known non-record evidence relevant to that
claim, by moving for an evidentiary hearing.
In the absence of any governing procedure, the court of
appeals silently lumped the record evidence with the allegations of
non-record evidence contained in Mr. Oliver's motion for an
evidentiary hearing.

Because much of the evidence alleged in the

motion for an evidentiary hearing has never been developed,
Mr. Oliver has not had a fair opportunity to establish the claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.

Should Mr. Oliver pursue a

petition for postconviction relief, the court presiding over those
proceedings will have the difficult, if not impossible, task of
determining the finality to give to the court of appeals' decision.
In order to protect criminal defendants' due process rights
to thorough and meaningful adjudication of an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim, this Court should grant the writ on Question 2,

8. See Jensen v. DeLand. 795 P.2d 619, 621 (Utah
1989)(ineffective assistance of counsel is a due process violation
which is reviewable in postconviction relief proceedings); Hurst v.
Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1032-1036 (Utah 1989)(discussing application of
res judicata and waiver doctrines in context of postconviction
relief).
- 11 -

and establish procedural and/or evidentiary rules on how a criminal
defense attorney on direct appeal is to present evidence, which was
not originally presented in the trial court, to establish
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Oliver requests that this Court grant a writ of
certiorari on Questions 1 and 2 presented in this petition.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of November, 1991,

>ijBftodk
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, Elizabeth Holbrook, hereby certify that ten copies of
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and four copies will be
delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114, this

)])

day of November, 1991.
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DELIVERED by

this

of November, 1991,
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APPENDIX 1

OLIVER OPINION AND ORDER DENYING REHEARING

to pay the filing fee.
The actions of Judge Hanson were justified.
I don't believe the legislature ever intended
that filing fees should be waived where a party
has retained a private attorney and has paid
legal fees to that attorney.
The overwhelming majority of people
seeking divorce are struggling financially as
they attempt to support two households on the
same amount of money with which they previously supported one. Most could file similar
affidavits. If only a portion of the 7,000 divorces filed each year in Salt Lake County
successfully sought a waiver of filing fees, the
cost to the taxpayers could be hundreds of
thousands of dollars annually.
Unfortunately, Ms. Kelsey is caught in the
middle.6 Although I am sympathetic to her
plight, I cannot condone the practice of court
costs "taking a back seat" to attorney fees.
Here, the principle involved is crucial. Therefore, this court should stand by the decision of
Judge Hanson and deny the petition for a writ
of mandamus.
. Leonard H. Russon, Judge
1. Legal Aid Society of Salt Lake provides indigent
representation to the Salt Lake County community.
Other similar organizations provide legal services to
indigents in other cities and counties in the State.
2. Ms. Kelsey testified that she never actually dealt
with Mr. Barnard, but with a member of his staff,
Valerie Gylling. The Utah State Bar Directory does
not list Valerie Gylling. Utah Code Ann. §78-5125 (1987) prohibits any person who is not a member
of the bar and licensed to practice law from practicing law or holding himself or herself out as an
attorney.
3. These means are provided by Legal Aid Society
which, in conjunction with the Salt Lake County
Bar pro bono program, provides local attorneys,
who donate their time free of charge, to serve indigent clients.
4. The complaint did not even seek an award of
attorney fees that would enable Ms. Kelsey to
recover from the defendant the $100 that she paid to
Mr. Barnard.
5. Moreover, if Ms. Kelsey's immediate protection
had been at issue, the proper action would be to
advise her to obtain an immediate protective order
from the district court, pursuant to the Cohabitant
Abuse Act, Utah Code Ann. §§30-6-1 to 30-611 (Supp. 1991), which does not require the assistance of legal counsel nor the payment of fees. Utah
Code Ann. §30-6-4 (Supp. 1991).
6. If, on the other hand, Mr. Barnard were to
return the $100 to Ms. Kelsey, there would be
nothing to prevent Judge Hanson from waiving the
filing fee.
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IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
• v.
Greg N. OLIVER,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 890625-CA
FILED: September 26, 1991
Third District, Salt Lake County
Honorable Michael R. Murphy
ATTORNEYS:
Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Marian Decker, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and
Jackson.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Appellant Greg N. Oliver appeals his conviction of burglary, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202
(1989) and theft, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404
(1989) on the bases that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a continuance and that
admissible evidence supports only a misdemeanor theft conviction. We affirm in part, and
reverse and remand in part.

BACKGROUND
At 2:30 p.m. on January 7, 1989, John
Spielmans returned home from a basketball
game with his son. He noticed that the side
door to his garage, which was usually locked,
was open. Spielmans went into the garage to
investigate. He then saw a man dressed in a
dark cap and dark jacket jump over a chain
link fence ten to twelve feet away and run
north. Spielmans began chasing the man, but
lost sight of him. Spielmans returned home
and noticed that the front door to his house
was dented and that it appeared someone had
been inside the house. He called 911 and
waited outside for the police to arrive. While
he was waiting, one of Spielmans's neighbors
called his attention to a man who was leaning
against a wooden fence across the street.
Noting the similarity of that person's clothing
to that of the man he had observed running
away, Spielmans concluded it was the same
person. Spielmans walked toward the man,

uvti nid i t n anuuiuti ad ojjiciiiiciiii ctppi Udtucu

jury oi unc cuum oi bciuiiu ucgree ourgiary

him and said, "It wasn't me, man" before
driving off. Spielmans again called 911 and
described the car, including the license plate
number and the direction of travel.
When Deputy Matthews arrived to investigate, Spielmans told him that a watch, a gold
ring, four one-dollar bills and four or five
gold Canadian coins were missing from his
house. Deputy Matthews also spoke with
Spielmans's neighbor who saw the man run
across his front yard, climb into the parked
car and speed away when Spielmans approached him.
Deputy Matthews ran a computer check on
the license plate of the car and obtained the
vehicle owner's name and address. He then
went to the vicinity of that address to investigate further. He saw a man fitting the description that Spielmans had given, exit the
vehicle owner's residence.
Based on his own observations, the license
plate number of the car and the descriptions
given by both Spielmans and his neighbor,
Deputy Matthews obtained a picture of defendant, Greg N. Oliver, from the police records
division. The next day, he returned to Spielmans's home with the photo of Oliver and
showed it to Spielmans, advising him that he
had reason to believe that Oliver was the same
person Spielmans described. Spielmans identified Oliver as the man he had seen.
Three days after the incident, Deputy Matthews assembled a photo spread, including the
picture of Oliver and pictures of five other
men. He showed the photo spread to Spielmans, who again identified Oliver as the
suspect. Deputy Matthews also showed the
photo spread to three of Spielmans's neighbors, two of whom identified Oliver as the
person they had observed the day of the incident.
Oliver was arrested and charged with one
count of burglary, a second degree felony and
one count of theft, a third degree felony.
The trial judge granted two continuances
prior to the case actually being tried. At the
final pretrial conference, on August 28, 1989,
Oliver's attorney told the trial judge that he
was ready to proceed to trial and agreed to a
trial date of September 5, 1989.
After the pretrial conference, Oliver entered
into plea negotiations with the State. The trial
judge's clerk told both the State and Oliver's
attorney, however, to prepare as if they were
going to trial as scheduled. The night before
trial, Oliver agreed to the State's plea proposal and decided that he would enter a guilty
plea in the morning rather than go to trial.
The next morning, however, Oliver changed
his mind and decided that he wanted to go to
trial. Oliver's attorney moved for a one day
continuance, stating that he needed more time

and one count of third degree theft.
ISSUES
On appeal Oliver argues that: (1) the trial
court's denial of his motion for a continuance
denied him due process of law; (2) the trial
court's denial of his motion for a continuance
denied him effective assistance of counsel; and
(3) admissible evidence supports only a class A
misdemeanor theft conviction.
ANALYSIS
Due Process
Oliver argues that the trial court's denial of
his motion for a one day continuance violated
his right to due process because it forced his
counsel to proceed to trial without being
adequately prepared. Oliver asserts that his
attorney did not conduct any formal trial
preparation after Oliver decided to plead
guilty. Consequently, when he changed his
mind the next morning and decided he wanted
to go to trial, Oliver's counsel was not sufficiently prepared. Oliver claims that had his
attorney had one more day to prepare for
trial, he would have been better prepared to:
(1) support Oliver's testimony regarding his
prior conviction based on misidentification; (2)
expose weaknesses in the eyewitness identification testimony; and (3) support Oliver's
assertions concerning possible police misconduct involved in the photo show up.
The grant or denial of a continuance is
within the discretion of the trial court. State v.
Humpherys, 707 P.2d 109, 109 (Utah
1985)(per curiam); State v. Creviston, 646
P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982); State v. Moosman,
542 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah 1975). This court
will not reverse the trial court's decision
absent a clear abuse of discretion. Id.
When moving for a continuance, a party
must show that denial of the motion will
prevent the party from obtaining material and
admissible evidence, that any additional witnesses it seeks can be produced within a reasonable time, and that it has exercised due
diligence in preparing for the case before
requesting the continuance. State v. Linden,
761 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah 1988). Absent such
showing, the trial court does not abuse its
discretion if it denies the motion. Id. We are
also persuaded by Washington precedent, that
on appeal, the moving party must show that it
Hvas materially prejudiced by the court's denial
of the continuance or that the trial result
would have been different had the continuance
been granted. State v. Barker, 667 P.2d 108,
114 (Wash. App. 1983),
Oliver has failed to make the necessary
showing required by these cases. Oliver's
counsel did not allege that there were any
witnesses or evidence that he needed to obtain
^i

*

u

i

i

:i«ui«

L ~ J

*u,»

apcumcauy wnai nc neeaea 10 ao, or now or
why Oliver would be prejudiced if he was
denied the extra day. Defense counsel simply
requested time to conduct more formal trial
preparation.
Oliver's counsel also failed to demonstrate
that he exercised due diligence before requesting the continuance. Oliver's attorney represented Oliver at an arrest warrant hearing, the
pretrial conference and throughout plea negotiations with the State. At the pretrial conference, eight days before trial, defense counsel
told the trial judge that he was prepared to
proceed to trial. After the pretrial, the trial
judge instructed his court clerk to notify both
the State and defense counsel that, although
Oliver and the State were engaged in plea
negotiations, they should prepare as if they
were going to trial anyway. The trial judge
stated that Oliver was having a hard time
deciding whether or not he would accept the
State's plea bargain and that no one would
know until the day of trial whether or not he
would actually enter a plea. In denying the
motion, the trial judge stated:
All counsel, prosecution and
defense counsel were told that given
circumstances, as I understand
them, that Mr. Oliver could not
make up his mind, that everyone
needed to proceed, as if we were
going to trial, and the responses we
got from the respective offices of
prosecution and defense is that they
would act accordingly.
On appeal, Oliver has failed to show that he
was materially prejudiced by denial of this
motion. The trial lasted two days, instead of
only one, as scheduled. Therefore, Oliver's
counsel had the evening of the first day and
overnight to further prepare before the State's
case had been fully presented. In essence,
because the trial went two days, Oliver's
counsel was afforded the time to prepare that
he requested and which he would have had if
the continuance had been granted; All of the
State's witnesses were subject to recall by
defense counsel and the trial judge found that
defense counsel took full advantage of the
opportunity to cross-examine each of them.
Also, because the motion was denied and the
parties had to proceed to trial, one of the
State's witnesses was unable to appear. At the
end of the State's case, the trial judge made
the following statement regarding his denial of
Oliver's motion for a continuance:
Each of the witnesses who testified yesterday it seemed to me, that
there was full availability of crossexamination by [defense counsel]
and he took advantage of that ... I
want to make sure the record is

been made available to the defendant, to the witnesses ... and in
fact, since the trial did not conclude
in the first day, that there has been
extra time to prepare, extra time to
do whatever is necessary ....
Furthermore, it appears to me
that there may have been some
benefit in the sense that this witness
you mentioned, Mrs. Lehaman, is
not available.
Further, Oliver has not shown that the trial
result would have been different had the
continuance been granted. The record shows
that Oliver's counsel explored all of the areas
Oliver now complains of. Defense counsel
questioned Oliver about his previous conviction based on eye witness misidentification,
and again brought the prior misidentification
to the jury's attention during closing argument. He cross-examined each eyewitness
who testified and addressed the weaknesses of
each person's testimony at length in his
closing argument. Defense counsel also crossexamined Deputy Matthews about his investigation and the photo show up he conducted
with at least one of the eyewitnesses.
Oliver did not tell his attorney that he had
decided to plead guilty until the night before
trial. Any formal trial preparation should have
been done before that time. Oliver does not
show that he was materially prejudiced by the
court's denial of this motion or that the trial
would have been different had the continuance
been granted. Therefore, we find that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the motion for a continuance and that such
denial did not deprive Oliver of due process.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Oliver claims that the trial court's denial of
his motion for a one day continuance denied
him effective assistance of counsel. As in his
due process argument, Oliver contends that his
counsel was not sufficiently prepared to: (1)
support Oliver's testimony regarding his prior
conviction based on misidentification; (2)
expose weaknesses in the eyewitness identification testimony; or (3) support Oliver's assertions concerning possible police misconduct
involved in the photo show up. Oliver argues
that his counsel's failure to more fully explore
these issues constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), the United States
Supreme Court established a two-part test
for determining whether a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel has been denied. The
defendant must show: (1) that his or her
counsel's performance was deficient; and (2)
that
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oraer to prevail, la.
An attorney's performance is deficient when
it falls below the objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65;
State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah
1990); Stare v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893
(Utah 1989). The defendant must point to
specific instances in the record which, under
the circumstances, show that counsel's performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066; Templin, 805 P.2d at
186; State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204, 212 (Utah
App. 1991).
In assessing trial counsel's performance, an
appellate court must "'indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within
the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance ....'" Templin, 805 P.2d at 186
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.
Ct. at 2065).
Although Oliver points to three specific
areas in which he claims his counsel should
have been more prepared, the record, as discussed regarding Oliver's due process claims,
establishes that his attorney presented evidence
and argument to the jury in all of these areas.
Any additional evidence would have been
cumulative. Oliver has failed to demonstrate
how his counsel's performance was deficient
and therefore we need not address whether
Oliver was prejudiced by such performance.
We conclude that Oliver was not denied effective assistance of counsel.
Admissibility of Evidence
Oliver argues that the State failed to introduce admissible evidence establishing that the
value of the stolen property totalled over $250
as required for a third degree felony theft
conviction under Utah Code Ann. §76-6412(l)(b)(1989).i
Spielmans reported that a watch, a ring,
four one-dollar bills and four or five Canadian coins were stolen from his home. At trial,
Spielmans testified that the watch was worth
one hundred twenty-five dollars, the four
dollar bills were worth four dollars and that
the total value of the coins was approximately
three dollars and seventy-five cents. When
questioned about the ring's value, the following exchange occurred:
Q. [THE PROSECUTOR]: And at
the time that the ring was taken,
did you have an opinion as to the
value of that ring?
A. [SPIELMANS]: I did have, and
whatever that opinion was is reflected in the police report. I don't
recall.
Q: You do not recall?
A: No.
Q: Is there anything that would
help refresh your recollection?

report, I believe.
Q: I'm asking you if looking at the
police report refreshes your recollection as to the ring.
A: As to the ring?
Q: As to the ring. Thank you.
A: I'm sure it reflects what I said. I
just
don't recall.
Q: ... Having looked at this report,
this police report, does that refresh
your recollection as to how you
valued the ring at that time?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. What was the value you
placed on that ring at that time?
A: I really can't recall. It states
S200 on there. That's what I said.
If it says $200 on there, that's what
I said.
The police report was not introduced into
evidence.
Oliver claims that Spielmans's testimony,
based on the police report, that the ring was
worth $200 is inadmissible because Spielmans
lacked personal knowledge of the value and
his memory was not refreshed by the police
report. Therefore, Oliver contends that the
State proved a total value of less than $250 for
the stolen property, which constitutes a class
A misdemeanor under §76-6-412(l)(c) 2 ,
rather than a felony.
The State argues that the evidence presented
is sufficient to sustain the felony conviction.
Before we can assess whether the evidence is
sufficient to support a felony theft conviction,
we must first determine whether the evidence
that the ring was worth $200 was properly
admitted, as that evidence is necessary for a
felony conviction.
In reviewing a trial court's decision to
admit evidence, we will not reverse that ruling
unless a substantial right of the party has been
affected, ^rare v. Morgan, 162 Utah Adv.
Rep. 61, 61 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Salt Lake
City, v. Holtman, 806 P.2d 235, 237 (Utah
App. 1991)); Utah R. Evid. 103(a).
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 602, a witness
may only testify about matters of which the
witness has personal knowledge. A witness
may use a writing to refresh his or her
memory for the purpose of testifying. Utah R.
Evid. 612(1).
...
It is evident from the trial transcript that
Spielmans had no independent, knowledge or
memory of the value of the ring, nor was his
memory refreshed after looking at the police
report. He had no present personal knowledge
of the ring's value and, therefore, his testimony concerning the value is inadmissible. We
find that admissible evidence sunDorts onlv a

rore, we reverse ana remand on the telony
theft conviction issue.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the
trial court's denial of the motion for a continuance, and reverse and remand on the felony
theft conviction for proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(1) (1989) provides:
,y
(1) Theft of property and services as
provided in this chapter shall be punishable:
(b) as a felony of the third degree if
the: (i) value of the property or services
is more than $250 but not more than
$1000;
2. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(l)(c) (1989) provides:
(1) Theft of property and services as
provided in this chapter shall be punishable:
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the
value of the property stolen was more
than $100 but does not exceed $250;
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OPINION
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
Defendant entered a guilty plea to ten
counts of forgery, all second-degree felonies,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-501
(1990), and eight counts of theft, one thirddegree felony and seven second-degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6404 (1990). Defendant subsequently attempted
to set aside his guilty plea and resulting conviction by contending that the trial court did
not strictly comply with Rule 11(5) of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure as required
by State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah
1987). His motion was denied. Defendant now
appeals the denial of his motion to set aside
his guilty plea. We reverse and remand.
When defendant originally entered his guilty
plea, the trial court conducted a colloquy with
defendant on the record regarding his desire to
enter his plea. During that colloquy, the court
addressed each of defendant's constitutional
rights enumerated in Rule 11(5). The trial
court did not, however, ask the defendant on
the record if he knew that by pleading guilty
he was waiving those rights.
Defendant asserts that the trial court's
failure to ask him specifically if he knew that
he was waiving his rights rendered his plea
unacceptable under Rule 1H5).1 Rule 11(5)
provides in pertinent part:
The court ... may not accept the
plea until the court has found:
(c) the defendant knows he has
rights against compulsory selfincrimination, to a jury trial, and to
confront and cross-examine in
open court the witnesses against
him, and that by entering the plea
he waives all of those rights;
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5) (emphases added).
Defendant makes this claim even though in his
affidavit he affirmatively acknowledged that
he knew he was waiving each of his rights
enumerated in Rule 1 l(5)(c).
Recently, this court held in State v. Smith,
812 P.2d 470,477 (Utah App.), petition for cert,
filed, 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (Utah '
1991), and State v. Trujillo-Martinez, 162
Utah Adv. Rep. 64 (Utah App. 1991), that a
trial court could consider both the colloquy and
the affidavit in determining whether the
defendant's plea was being entered in strict
compliance with Rule 11(5).2 Subsequently,
however, the Utah Supreme Court's decision
in State v. Hoffy 164 Utah Adv. Rep. 21
(Utah 1991) seems to have foreclosed that
interpretation. In Hoff, the supreme court
stated that Gibbons requires that the trial
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APPENDIX 2

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

TEXT OF CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law.
Article I, Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.
In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Amendment VI to the Constitution of the United States provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.

Amendment XIV to the Constitution of the United States provides:
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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v.
GREG N. OLIVER,

Case No. 890625-CA
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Defendant/Appellant.

A.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL CONTEXT
Mr. Oliver was tried and convicted by a jury of Burglary

and Theft on September 5 and 6 of 1989, sentenced to the Utah State
Prison for concurrent terms of zero to five and one to fifteen
years, and ordered to pay restitution (R. 166-167).1
On the first day of trial, Mr. Oliver's trial counsel moved
for a continuance, explaining that trial counsel had expected to
dispose of the case through a plea and had not done any preparation
for trial of the case, "Based on that, I didn't do any formal trial
preparation that I normally do for a trial such as this, and

1. The district court pleadings file will be referred to
as WR.W. The transcript of the hearing on the motion to suppress
will be referred to as "M.H.". The transcript of the trial
(contained in two volumes, numbered consecutively) will be referred
to as M T. M .

consequently, I am not prepared to proceed to trial.w (T. 4). The
trial court apologetically denied the motion for a continuance
(T. 9 ) .
Shortly after the State's case had been presented, the
trial court made a record concerning the court's denial of the
motion for a continuance, explicitly finding that any error in the
denial was harmless and not prejudicial to Mr. Oliver (T. 146-147).
Mr. Oliver seeks a remand to the trial court to establish
that the denial of the motion for continuance resulted in the denial
of his rights to due process of law and effective assistance of
counsel.

This case involves a burglary and theft that occurred on
January 7, 1989 (R. 6-7). The prosecution of Mr. Oliver was
primarily based on the eyewitness identification of four witnesses
who saw a person in the vicinity of the burglary and theft.

The essence of Mr. Oliver's defense was that the State's
eyewitnesses had misidentified him as the person in the vicinity of
•the burglary and theft—he testified that he had previously been
convicted of aggravated robbery on the basis of eyewitness
identification and that he was later acquitted of that conviction
when his innocence was established (T. 149). His testimony on this
point was as follows:
Okay. Mr. Oliver, have you ever been convicted
of a felony?
Yes, I was.
When was that?

First, it was back in '83. I was convicted of
aggravated robbery, and the jury trial was
convicted because I have this blond hair. A year
later they caught the guys that did it, and I was
acquitted.
Okay.
They took me from prison and brought me back here
to jail, and I—in '82 I had mv right hand
severed off and I filled a prescription and—
Forged a prescription?
I altered it. I filled it. Somebody else forced
it. I filled it and the doctor give me Motrin.
Were vou convicted for that?
Yes. The put that—charged me in that and
convicted me of that and sentenced me back to
prison.
Then vou were on parole?
Yes. Thev let me out on parole after that. And
I expirated in November of /88.
(T. 149-150)(emphasis added).2
As is discernable from examination of the emphasized
portion of Mr. Oliver's testimony, supra, there were problems with
Mr. Oliver's credibility.

In addition to his admission that he had

been involved in and convicted of forgery, the jurors were also
faced with Officer Matthews' testimony that Officer Matthews had a
hunch that the offender in this case was Mr. Oliver (T. 116).
Officer Matthews also indicated that when Mr. Spielmans reported the
crime, Mr. Spielmans seemed to think that he knew the suspect from
his work with Adult Probation and Parole (T. 124).

2.

In closing argument, trial counsel argued, in part, as

follows:
Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Oliver, as he testified
was sent to prison once on mistaken identity.
And was released when they caught the right
person. I would ask you not let that happen
again, to review this evidence and bring back a
verdict of not guilty on both charges.
(T. 201).

Trial counsel should have procured evidence to support
Mr. Oliver's testimony.

A review of the district court pleadings

file in the 1982 case referred to by Mr. Oliver establishes that
Mr. Oliver was in fact convicted and that the conviction was later
set aside when the actual perpetrators confessed.

Trial counsel for

Mr. Oliver in the 1982 case indicates that the basis of that
conviction was misidentification of Mr. Oliver.

See Appendix 1#

containing the affidavit of counsel; Appendix 2, containing
certified documents from the district court pleadings file in the
1982 misidentification, aggravated robbery case; State v. Tempiin,
149 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1990)(ineffective assistance of counsel
established when trial counsel failed to call witness to corroborate
defendant's testimony).
The trial court should have granted the motion for the
continuance so that trial counsel could prepare to represent
Mr. Oliver.

Salt Lake Sheriff's Deputy, Kevin Matthews, testified that
in investigating this case on January 7, he had an idea that the
suspect was Mr. Oliver, and so he obtained a photograph of
Mr. Oliver through the records division of the Department of
Corrections and took it to Mr. Spielmans for identification
(T. 116). He indicated that when he showed Mr. Oliver's photograph
to Mr. Spielmans, he told Mr. Spielmans that he had "reason"to
believe this may be the person that entered his residence earlier
that day" (T. 117). When Officer Matthews asked Mr. Spielmans if

Mr. Spielmans could identify the person in the photo, Mr. Spielmans
pointed at the photo and said, "That's the guy." (T. 117).3
When asked if he showed the single photo to any of the
other witnesses, he did not recall having done so (T. 116). His
police report indicated, "I contacted the witnesses at their
residences, . . . and they were able to pick Mr. Oliver out a[s] the
suspect in the burglary from a picture." (T. 122-123) (emphasis
added).

Officer Matthews tried to explain the report by noting that

he may have shown the photo to Mr. Spielmans' son, who did not see a
suspect at the scene of the crime (T. 122). When asked repeatedly
about the discrepancy between the report and his testimony, Officer
Matthews would not commit himself, answering with phrases like "I
don't believe" and "all I remember" (T. 123).
As is demonstrated by review of the record in this case,
trial counsel did not ask two of the four eyewitnesses if Officer
Matthews had shown them the one photo, mug shot show up of
Mr. Oliver prior to their exposure to the photo array, the line-up,
or Mr. Oliver's in-court appearance (T. 83-95; 95-102).
Trial counsel should have addressed the possibility that
three of the four eyewitnesses were improperly tainted by the one

3. Compare Officer Matthews' testimony at the motion to
suppress, "And Mr. Spielmans observed the picture and stated that he
felt positive that that was the suspect." (M.H. 267, 271-272) ~
Compare Mr. Spielmans' testimony that he indicated that the photo
appeared to be the person (T. 52).

photo, mug shot show up.4
The trial court should have granted the motion for the
continuance so that trial counsel could prepare to represent
Mr. Oliver.

As was discussed above, at least one of the eyewitnesses
was shown a one photo, mug shot show up the day after the crime, and
was subsequently shown a photo array and line-up, and identified
Mr. Oliver as the perpetrator of the crime in this case (T. 52, 54,
58, 61, 116-117, 127-128; R. 3, M.H. 233-234).
The same mug shot used in that show up was placed in the
photo array that was shown to all of the State's witnesses
(M.H. 228-230, in Appendix 3).
At the pretrial motion to suppress eyewitness
identification, Mr. Oliver was represented by Lynn R. Brown of the
Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (M.H. 219). However, at trial,
Mr. Oliver was represented by new, private counsel. The prosecutor
and trial court apparently forgot that the mug shot (State's
Exhibit 1 from the motion to suppress) was part of the photo array,
and thought that the one photo from the show up had been lost
(T. 52-53, 59-60, in Appendix 4).

4. The eyewitness
one photo, mug shot show up
and did not identify anyone
questioned by the police or
the story (T. 151, 163).

who indicated that she was not shown the
identified Mr. Oliver in the photo arrayat the line up or at trial (T. 78-8D) .
given an opportunity to tell his side of

Trial counsel should have reviewed the motion to suppress
and addressed the prejudice arising from this repeated suggestion of
Mr. Oliver's mug shot in the show up and then in the photo array.
The trial court should have granted the motion for the
continuance so that trial counsel could prepare to represent
Mr. Oliver.

The essence of Mr. Oliver's view of the case was that he
was innocent and that his conviction was based on police misbehavior
and failure to investigate honestly.

He indicated that he was never

questioned by the police or given an opportunity to tell his side of
the story (T. 151, 163).
Although Mr. Oliver indicated that his parole had expired
in November of 1988 (T. 150), he was arrested by three parole
officers (T. 156-157).
He disputed Officer Matthews' testimony that Mr. Oliver had
evaded Officer Matthews during the investigation of the crime
(T. 108-112), indicating that Mr. Oliver did not hear a siren, and
asking that Officer Matthews be recalled and asked if Officer
Matthews had turned his red light on (T. 155-156, 165). While
Officer Matthews testified that he saw Mr. Oliver exiting Karen
Weed's home during the alleged evasion, Mr. Oliver indicated that a
photograph of the scene would have shown that from where Officer
Matthews was standing, his view of Karen Weed's home was blocked~"by
a fence (T.160-161).

Trial counsel should have sought the evidence necessary to
corroborate Mr. Oliver's testimony concerning the police misconduct
in this case, which may have borne directly on Officer Matthews'
credibility and the identification procedures used in this case.
See Tempiin. supra.
The trial court should have granted the motion for the
continuance so that trial counsel could prepare to represent
Mr. Oliver.

B. LEGAL BASIS FOR ALLEGATIONS OF DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution guarantees all
people the right to due process of law:

"No person shall be

deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides more specific
protections to those accused of crime:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process to compel the attendance of witnesses in
his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases.
In no instance shall any accused person, before
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or
fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband, nor a husband
against his wife, nor shall any person be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense.

The sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution provide the accused with rights to due process and
assistance of counsel.5
These constitutional provisions and the counterparts have
been interpreted and applied in contexts similar to the instant one,
and support Mr. Oliver's assertions that the trial court's denial of
the motion for continuance, trial counsel's lack of preparation in
this case, and improper identification procedures and other police
misconduct denied him due process of law and effective assistance of
counsel and void his convictions.

E.a«. Nelson v. Johnson. 669 P.2d

1207 (Utah 1983)(component of due process is provision of adequate
time for preparation of defense); State v. Tempi in, 149 Utah Adv.
Rep. 14 (Utah 1990)(effective assistance of counsel requires

5.

The sixth amendment provides,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be
confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
counsel for his defence.
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides,
All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

investigation and preparation of defense); State v. Thamer, 777 P.2d
432 (Utah 1989)(due process requires reliable eyewitness
identification).6

CONCLUSION
Mr. Oliver seeks a remand to the trial court to determine
whether trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient and
prejudicial, Strickland v. Washington; 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and
to determine whether the trial court's failure to grant the
continuance and the improper identification procedures require a new
trial in this case.
In the alternative, Mr. Oliver requests that the due date
for his opening brief be extended until fifteen days after
disposition of the motion to remand.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of Jctnuary, 1991.

iL"!rzXBETH<HOJdBROOK
Ltto^ney fojr) Mr. Oliver

6. Mr. Oliver is aware that in order to rely on the Utah_
Constitution, he must present adequate briefing on the matter in the
trial court, State v. Earl. 716 P.2d 803 (Utah 1986), and intends to
do so in the event that this Court grants the remand.

DELIVERED/MAILED a copy of the foregoing t o the Attorney
G e n e r a l ' s O f f i c e , 236 S t a t e Capitol, S a l t Lake City, Utah 84114,
this

c^^dav

of il.jnu.iry,

1491.
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ELIZABETH HOLBROOK, #5292
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 Southf Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 532-5444
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v
GREG N

AFFIDAVIT

:
:

OLIV ER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.
Ji
)

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

:

Or ijl'Ail
ss:

Case No- 890625-CA
Priority No• 2

s-r

)

I , ELIZABETH HOLBROOK,. declarer under: penalty: of. perjury p.:-r.c.i-:y
that the following is true and correct:^ L. *•- r;i i^rr':.;.;
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State

of O'tcih an I employed as an appellate attorney at the Salt Lake Legal
Defender Association.
2.

I am the attorney appointed to represent GREG N. OLIVER

in the above-captioned case during the pendency of his appeal*
3.

I was not present during the trial of this matter and

did not represent Mr. Oliver at trial.
4.

I have spoken with Robert N. Macri, the attorney who

represented Mr. Oliver in the aggravated robbery/misidentification
case documented in Appendix 2 to th i s brief.

5.

It is my understanding from talking to Mr. Maori that:
(a) in that aggravated robbery case, Mr. Oliver was

convicted on the basis of eyewitness identification
testimony of two witnesses;
(b) Mr. Oliver was later acquitted of that charge when
the real perpetrator of the crime was found.
(c) Visual comparison of Mr. Oliver and the
perpetrator of the aggravated robbery demonstrates
effectively Mr. Oliver's argument that eyewitness
identification/is unreliable.
DATED this

f 1) day of January. 1991.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this / £>
January, 1991.

, day of

_

ifeA^
NOTARY PUBLIC
'
Residing i n S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
My Commission
Expires:
commission E:
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In the District Court of Davis County
State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH

HtCHAELG.AULPHIN.CUuk
Owrfs County. Utah
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
AND COMMITMENT TO THE
UTAH STATE PRISON

Plaintiff

GREGORY NESS OLIVER

Case No. 4213

^ Defendant
That when**, aid defendants

GREGORY NESS OLIVER

having heretofore on the 9 t h day of
J"tie
Having been convicted by a Jury
FWtGwtty

«r

FILED
j U L i ^993

, A D. 19 83 ,
of
the

t^ 3,^

m

a w t l w Cw»wm »y a Jwrr

1*

the charge of Aggravated Robbery, Second degree felony

Of

.
£ felony

^ ^
[J

ind now being present in court, accompanied by his attorney, and ready for sentence, thereupon the
court renders its Judgment as follows:
You, Gregory Nffna Oliver
_ _

.J
U-

_

_

__

Having been convicted by a Jury _ ^

^

c m t

adjlld|SCS

having
y ^ to

be guilty and it is the judgment of the court and the sentence ot the law tliat you ...,
Gregory Ness Oliver

__ _ . , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ , _ _ _

_

_

for your said offense do be confined in the Utah State Prison for the term of *«• m « f » — _
years

_

s

EP IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the said
Gregory Ness Oliver

_

« _ — _ _ — _ _

_

_ _ _ _ . — ,

_

_

_

be sentenced to imprisonment

in the Utah State Prison for a term of on* to fifca«n years, Aim-^Y-RESTITmOK^X-—,
THE AMOUNT OF $550.00.
_
_____ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_
said sentence to begin as of
NOW, THEREFORE, you

Jun

«

28

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Gregory HMM Oliver

_

19J2-

____.,__,__.___,_

- the
above named defendant , are remanded into the custody ot the Sheriff of Davis County, State of
Utah, to be by htm delivered into the custody of the Warden, or other proper officer of said Utah
State Prison in execution of this judgment and sentence.
WITNESS: Honorable
Douglas L Coraaby
—
,
Judge, and the seal of the District Court ot the Second Judicial District in and for the State of
Utah affix*! this
28
day of Jm»
_ _ .
., A. D. 19—33
QDNEY W., WAUSJL
Clerk of the District Court of the Second
Judicial District in and for Davis County,
^^
State of Utah.
By .

-

^

^

Received "ttfir^thi day of Juna, 1983, from Brant Johnaoa, Sheriff of Davia
County. Utah, tha paraon of Gregory Haaa Oliver for tha tarn of 1 to 15 Tra
at thJtStkh State?-Prlaon for Aggr. Bobbery.

Alao 1 Tr for Theft.
I.D. 4

ftf?*
Circuit Court, State of Utah
Davis County, Bountiful Department
sTAigoFvuTAgvv

J

Commitment
U-979

GREGORY NESS OLIVER
Defendant

THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH:
The above-named defendant has been charged with the crime of
TWFFT

.

,

BOUNTIFUL. DAVIS COUNTY. UTAH

at.

A~~

JULY 15. 1980

( X) The defendant was found guilty and was sentenced to pay i line of
s

00

.

and to be imprisoned in the county jail for
0

days and

days of the imprisonment was suspended upon payment of the fine.

YOU AR£ COMMANDED to takr the defrndanr into

nur mstody and safety keep chr defendant

( 30 until he shall serve out the imprisonment of _ _ _ 3 £ o

Cp~,%1 u,^»^^.

^fiS

days.

TWT.S TTMF MAY BF SF3VFB CONCTTKHFNTT.Y WTTH ANV

JATT, <;TT>jTFNrF r>TC,TT?Trr mtTPT MTCWT K W

f\K MP

ill u p

n

^

TF THF SFNTFNrE TM TITC/niTrT mTTRT TC T F c c TW^M 1 VTAP^ M?

TTTNF ? g

m TV?P Mrrc-r

rDMPT.FTF TWF VFAP. ON THF CF>TTFMrg AM TXTTC rVAPrjr

1

T^-—4

TTrMTT 07

1 Q*n

TQflT

r w, /s ) r

ROBERT MACSI, "Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
354 East 600 South
Salt Lake City 84111
Tel 354-3018

- • • ; • : • ; .*
J .----.—
IS THE DAVIS COUNTY DISTRICT '
COURT OF UTAH

^-V :

.

'''iTT/./'Z''*

:

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

::

vs.
GREGORY NESS OLIVER,
Defendant

>
•••

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
and NOTICE OF HEARING

•
*

No. Cr 4215

COMES NOT DEFENDANT GREGORY N. OLIVER, through his attorney of record, and
moves this Court for a new trial'in the above captioned matter for the reason ,;.;">.
that newly discovered evidence proves conclusively that Defendant did not
wai^cmtesstona^s.^tj^^^^

commit: /the crime for .which heJias.J>een declared guilty

obtained by Davis County law enforcement officials from the guilty parties
require that such new trial be granted*—- ..7-Dated

••- -.-~K.r*<i

tnis 13th Au3U3t,-1983. .- . ; . r . ^ ^ t 'va-

'

"

Robert Macri
NOTICE OF HEARING
Please note that Defendant's Motion for New Trial will be heard Tuesday, August 16,
1983 in the above captioned Court at the Suwxr of 1:30 P.M# or a3 soon thereafter
as same may be heard•
' f\
! /j
A
Certificate of Mailine
I certify I mailed a copy of the foregoing Motion for New Trial and Notice of
Hearing to Mr« Mel Wilson, Esq., Deputy County Attomay, Davis County Courthouse,
Faraington Utah 34025. postpaid this 13th^August, 1983.
S - .•.C/-JT.4H

)

f t .

arjr.T- c? DAVIS

) »

( A / J ,
<

I 71-2 «J.%l25.«iG>lFn m rou> ^ e - w ^ ~.

^ w 4 J u - " ^ O "* ORIG'KAL DOCUMENT ON
RLSitf Mr 'J>??C2 AS SUCH CL23JC
WITMcSS MY K/NC SEAL OF SAID OFFICE

THIS J L 2 - DAY OF

U(°C_.

ig

£Q

<

A
V

^ W

r

/ t o . ,

/ ' v<L I^G^

.

In die District Court of die Second Judicial District
IN MIB V\)R THE

_ County of Davis, State of Utah

MINUTE ENTRY
j^p

STA1E OF UTAH

August 16, 1983

Plaintiff
¥3.

C i v No,
CALVTN GOULD

4215

.» Judge

GREGORY NESS OLIVER
Defendant

J

3 . Jones, Reporter
C. Long, Clerk

This matter comes before the Court for hearing on Motion for
New T r i a l with Ifielvin C. Wilson, Esq. appearing as coxmsel for p l a i n t i f f .
Defendant i s present and represented by Robert Macri, Esq.
P l a i n t i f f ' s counsel makes statement to the Court representing
there has been further i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t h i s matter, and based upon
that i n v e s t i g a t i o n and copies of confessions of two other parties, moves
t o dismiss t h i s case.
Court orders the defendant released from custody of the Utah
S t a t e Mr i s on.

Motion granted.

CClfNT/CFOAVlS

)

•IQ
C\^£L>%
THB-lS-DAYOF. ^ < ^ _

ALYSONE-BROWN.

BY

^ E DISTRICT

— — — 19-i^r

ra

THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTR£9£ rgy^yvf ^ j |

C S

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTA^gQ SEP" 19 AH II: k7
2 M DISTRICT COUST
THE STATE OF UTAH/

BY.

Plaintiff,

46
KPUTY OS»

ORDER RELEASING EVIDENCE

vs.

Case No.

GREGORY N. OLIVER

4215

Defendant.

Q
LU

The above matter having come before the Court at the

-J

request of the Defendant for an Order releasing evidence and it

Li-

appearing to the Court that the previous conviction having been
set aside and the Information dismissed and all time periods for
appeal having elapsed;
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of
the Court* shall release to Gregory Oliver one levi jacket presently
being held in evidence in regards to the above-mentioned case.
Dated this

/£-

day of September, 1983.

Second District Judge
»

•• ~ -± .•••-:,-V:-;-^': C*-EB;< o* THE ois-nicT
z : r • a? >A «.:COUMTY.UTAHCCHEREBYcsn~ ? '• " V i r ->?i/.:;«*oC£D AMD?Cn2CCi«G'SATOUS
.*;--0 rVU. 'Zi-t £)P AM CSIGiNAi. DOCUMENT ON
FiLZ ;-i :•*? Qr'i-ZS. Mi SUCH CL2HK.
WITNESS MY HAND SEAL OF SAIO OFFICE
/

BY

ALYSCN E. SHOWN. CLERK

Appendi x 3
(to motion for evidentiary hearing)

that, time?

A

Yes, he did.
And did he show you:one^br more?pictures?
One picture.
MS. BYRNE:

May I approach the witness, Your

THE COURT:

You may.

MS. BYRNE:

Your Honor, do we need this marked

Honor?

for this hearing; jfor purposes^of this hearing?
MR. BROWN:

For purposes- of my mo tl on, 1 would

like the picture separated from the others as a~separate
exhibit.
THE COURT:

Let nie ask you this; if this matter'

goes to trial, is the photo array going to be an exhibit?
MS. BYRNE: ' Yes, it vill be; Your "Honor;
THE COURT:

How a re those attached :i n the folder?

MS. BYRNE:

I was just checking that here.

They

seem to be affixed on two sides with Scotch tape.
THE COURT:

Why don't we do this, why don't we.

take the picture in question from the photo array and mark
it on the back.
MS. BYRNE:

All right,

THE COURT:

That way, if we need the entire array

again we will have a clear record of everything.
MS. BYRNE:

Wo .mi qomcj to use the photo array
228

again immediately after this, s o —
THE COURT:

All right.

Then you can put the

individually-marked picture back in, or it can be just
loose.

Q

MS. BYRNE:

You have seen that?

MR- BROWN:

Yes.

(By Ms. Byrne)

I am showing you what has been

marked as Statefs Exhibit No. 1 for identification.

Have

you seen that picture before?
THE COURT:

Mr. Brown, can., the record reflect

that the picture in question is only the picture on the
left side as you look at that exhibit, rather than both
pictures?
MS. BYRNE:

Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. BROWN:

Yes.

THE COURT:

All right.

THE WITNESS:

It seems to be the exact picture I

saw.
Q

(By Ms. Byrne)

And to the best—

MR. BROWN:

To clear that up, the exact picture

MS. BYRNE:

That»s what I was about to do.

you s a w —
But

go ahead, if you would like.
MR. BROWN:

Go ahead.

MS. BYRNE:

Okay.
229

C?

(By Ms, Byrne)

So to the best of your.

recollection, this is a picture that Officer Matthews'
showed you on January 8?
A

That's right. -

0"

Du you recall what time of* day that was?

A

Late afternoon, I believe.

3:00 to 6:00.
thar

"•

I'm not really—

Could have been 3:00.

I can't be *ore precise

»:.

At the time Officer Matthews showed you that
picture, did he ask you any questions at that; t Ime?
A

can recall precisely.

Q

Did you make amy statement when you saw that

picture?

«*

piciurs?

,"!, believe I said I t appears to be.
Q

You would have, said" it appears* to b e — i-Xt^cp^rs

appears to be?
A

Sfes.

Q

It appears to be what?

A

The individual that I saw the day previously.

Q

At' JtiV t .me after January 8, did he show you any

other pictures?
A

Detective Matthews did not.

Q

Did another of fflcei show you any pictures?

A

Yes,

Detective Carr showed me a photo spread.

MS. BYRNE:

For the record, I have taken what was
230

marked as State's Exhibit No. 1 and I have placed it in its
original position in the six-picture lineup that has been
marked as State's Exhibit No. 2.
Q

(By Ms. Byrne)

Looking at State's Exhibit No. 2,

do you recognize that?
A

I recognize it as the defendant?

Q

Excuse me?

A

I recognize that guy as the defendant.

Q

Do you recognize that photo spread as a whole?

A

It's the same format.

I can't say the other

pictures are the same.
Q

You can't say it's the same one you were shown

before?
A

Yes. But it's the same format.

Q

And at the time you were shown the photo spread

containing six pictures by another officer, did you at that
time pick out a person that you believed to be the one you
saw on January 7?
A

I did.

Q

And what, i f any, statement did you make

concerning t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n to the d e t e c t i v e who showed
you t h a t photo spread?
A

That I f e l t the picture I had i d e n t i f i e d was the

person I ' d seen and chased.
Q

I'm sorry, you f e l t that what?
231
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k

I did.

a

Did he ask any questions about that photooraoh?

1

He asked me if that photograph was:the ..individual

who had burglarized my home.
ft

Did you make a response to that question?

k

Yes.

ft

It appeared to be what?

k

The defendant.

ft

I'm sorry, you said it appeared to be what?

k

I said the photograph appeared to be that of

I indicated that it appeared to be.

the defendant.
ft

Okay.

been a defendant.

Well, at that time there would not have
Who did you indicate that was a photograph]

of?
k

I indicated it appeared to be a photograph of

the individual who had burglarized my home.
MS. BYRNE:

Your Honor, may we approach the

bench for a moment on a matter of the picture?
THE COURT: Yes.
[Bench conference off the record.]
MS. BYBNE:

If I may have a moment, your Honor.

I seem to have misplaced an item of evidence that the next
question would be concerning.
to take a break for the benefit

If the Court was planning
of the reporter, I wonder

if I could request it be now so I could trot back across

52

1

the street and ,see if I: may have left it on my desk.
THE COURT:

2
3

Well, it's a little bit early.

The

photograph that you have asked him about?

4

MS. 'BYRNE:

There's another:one. ^r:-. ^ ^r.a^.&\-o:.J

5

THE COURT:

Well, is there any reason why we

6

can1 t proceed to the next series of questions, then come

7

back. to that? :It's at least clear in my mind.

8

MS. BYRNE:

We can.

9

THE COURT:

If we come back in an hour with

10

the picture I, at least, would remember Mr. Spielmans1

II

testimony that he just gave, and I can't assume anything

12

less on the part of .the .jury.

13

MS. BYRNE:

I'm sorry, your Honor.

14

THE COURT:

I'm sure the jury will figure it

15

out.

I just don't want to take a break now.

16
17

MS. BYRNE:

When was the Court planning on taking}

THE COURT:

Probably about quarter to 3:00.

the break?

18
19

If you finish before then, we can always come back.

20

sure the jury is going to understand, even though it may

21

be out of order a little bit.

22
23
24
25

MS. BYRNE:
Q,

I'm

That's fine.

After the occasion when you looked at this one

picture, were you then shown further pictures after that?
A.

Yes.

Sometime later.

I believe it was a week

53

1

home was burglarized, if you were to see the person that

2

you saw jumping over the fence at the side of your house

3

again, would you be able to recognize that person?

4

A.

I would.

5

ft

And is that person in the courtroom today?

6

A.

Yes, he is.

7

ft

And would you point him out for the jury, please?

8

A.

Gentleman in the ski sweater, the defendants

9

table.
MS. BYRNE:

10
11

I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I

May the record reflect that he has

identified the defendant, Mr. Greg Oliver?

12

MR. McCAUGHEY:

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. McCAUGHEY:

No objection.

The record will so reflect.
And to the best of your recollection

15

is that person that you just identified present at the

16

lineup that you observed?

17

A.

Yes.

18

ft

And is that person you picked out in the lineup?

19

A.

It is.

20

ft

And in the photo spread of six individuals that

21

you observed, was the person's picture in that photo lineup?

22

A.

It was.

23

ft

And is that the same person you have picked

24
25

out in the photo lineup?
A.

It is.

58

MS. BYRNE:

Your Honor, the State has no further

THE COURT:

Why don't we take a break now, then

questions.

you can run and
MS. BYRNE:

I was, subject to that.

THE COURT:

Members of the jury, we are going

to take a break at this time.

During which time Mrs. Byrne

will get the pictures she needs.

Remember the admonition

of the Court is to not discuss this matter with anyone,
including among yourselves, do not form or express any
opinions or conclusions.

And is ten minutes enough,

Mrs. Byrne?
MS. BYRNE:

I hope so, your Honor.

THE COURT:

All right.

break to ten minutes if we can.

We'll try to keep this

See you then.

[Whereupon, the jury exited the courtroom.]
THE COURT:

Do you have any jury instructions

MS. BYRNE:

I do.

THE COURT:

Anything else we need to address?

for me?

If not, we'll be in recess.
Recess

indicated

THE COURT:

Go ahead, Ms. Byrne.

MS. BYRNE:

Your Honor, Mr. Warner, who I

earlier is an investigator with our office, is
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1

here now.

I would like to have him with me, if for no other

2

reason, in case I misplace something else during at least

3

the afternoon proceedings.

4

Mr. McCaughey and he has no objection.

5

MR. McCAUGHEY:

6

THE COURT:

I have discussed it with

That's correct, your Honor.

All right.

Members of the jury,

7

Mr. Warner will be *n exception to the exclusionary rule.

8

There is an exception to that, and that is for a witness

9

who is present is necessary to aid counsel in the

10

presentation of the case.

11

exception, and Mr. McCaughey has agreed that he can stay,

12

so he will be with us.

13

Go ahead,

14

MS. BYRNE:

15

ft

Mr. Warner appears to fit that

Thank you, your Honor.

Mr. Spielmans, showing you what's been marked

16

as State's Exhibit 15 for identification, do you recognize

17

that?

You may want to look on both sides.
k

15 I

This appears to be the photo spread that I was

19 J shown at the sheriff's office.
20
21
22
23
24
25

ft

Okay.
A

believe.

And that would have been when?

Somewhat more than a week after the event, I
I don't recall the exact date.
MS. BYRNE:

State would move to have what has

been marked as State's Exhibit 15 introduced into evidence.
MR. McCAUGHEY:

No objection.
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